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Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure 
Kelli A. Alces† 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means painted what remains a defining 
portrait of corporate law.1  The separation of ownership and control they 
described and the agency costs it causes are still a central concern of the 
law of corporate governance.2  For that reason, Berle’s work is relevant 
nearly eighty years after its publication.  Seemingly forgotten, however, 
is that Berle’s enduring description of the corporate structure was pub-
lished before most of today’s corporate law was in place.  His work pre-
ceded the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and even preceded the dominance of Delaware common law in the 
field of corporate governance.3  Berle’s prescience is part of why his 
work is still so important to the development of the corporate law, but 
relying upon and taking for granted his observations has locked corporate 
law scholars and jurists into a paradigm that may no longer fit and that 
may be keeping us from moving forward as we ought to. 
The separation of ownership and control is an unavoidable conse-
quence of the corporate form, and many advantages of the corporate 
form lie in that separation.  While the separation remains, the distance 
between corporate shareholders and officers and directors has shrunk and 
could shrink further.  That is, shareholders have become more sophisti-
cated and less dispersed and enjoy enhanced protection from managerial 
abuse and increased rights to corporate information relative to when 
Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty.  Further, advances in securities markets and innovations in invest-
ment have changed what kinds of investors hold significant interests in 
the maximization of a firm’s profits.  With the ability to significantly 
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 2. William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 
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 3. Id. at 760. 
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hedge investments, shareholders may not have financial exposure to a 
firm’s financial health.4  Simultaneously, owners of derivatives may have 
substantial interests in the value of a firm’s residual claim, though they 
are not considered “owners” at all.5  The residual claim is most common-
ly regarded as the ownership interest in a corporation, yet those with an 
interest in the value of that claim are increasingly difficult to pinpoint.  
“Ownership” of a corporation just does not mean what it did in the late 
1920s and the early 1930s.  The corporate structure defined by Berle and 
Means is helpful but too simple.  As corporate law and investment 
change, so must our assumptions about the corporate form—both as it is 
and as it should be. 
It is not clear that shareholders qua shareholders should hold a spe-
cial status in corporate governance, particularly if we find less meaning 
in designating them as the “owners” of the firm.  Yet, as the owners of 
the residual claim, they are the best, most readily identifiable proxy we 
have for the equity interest.  A shareholder representative can help not 
only to mitigate the costs associated with the separation of ownership 
and control, but it can also address changes to the meaning of “owner-
ship” of the corporation by focusing on the representation of the equity 
interest rather than remaining preoccupied with the whims of individual 
equity holders.  Such a representative, or “equity trustee,” can overcome 
the collective action problem plaguing shareholders and bring meaning-
ful, sophisticated representation to the job shareholders must perform in 
corporate governance.  The use of an equity trustee may also help corpo-
rate governance find the right balance for various investor interests, de-
termining an appropriate place, strength, and role for each. 
In Part I, this Article reconsiders the meaning of ownership.  It be-
gins by returning to Berle and Means’s conception of corporate owner-
ship as an important starting point.  Part I then describes the shareholder 
primacy theory of corporate governance that grew out of the Berle and 
Means description of corporate ownership.  That theory has been signifi-
cant in shaping the corporate and securities laws enacted since the publi-
cation of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  The Part then 
explores the shareholder position’s special place in corporate law and 
describes how it has become a weak proxy for the goal of long-term 
wealth maximization.  Part II explores the use of an equity trustee and its 
potential role in addressing the current state of ownership and control.  It 
presents the equity trustee as a way to properly capture the shareholder 
                                                 
 4. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying  Empty Voting and Hidden (Morph-
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role and effectively execute the shareholder job in light of the changes to 
shareholder interests and practices in recent years.  Finally, Part III chal-
lenges corporate scholars to follow Berle’s example by conducting the 
same kind of searching analysis of the current state and structure of the 
corporation.  Asking the same kinds of questions and taking stock of 
what defines the corporate form now, especially as we are also on the 
cusp of a crippling financial crisis, may move corporate scholarship in 
the appropriate direction to respond to challenges posed this century. 
I.  THE MEANING OF OWNERSHIP 
Berle and Means considered the firm’s shareholders to be the cor-
poration’s owners for the purposes of their work in The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property, but they also acknowledged that other 
theorists include bondholders, and even workers, as owners of the firm in 
some important ways.6  This regard for a corporation’s shareholders as a 
firm’s owners and the most important party in interest gave rise to the 
shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance that has dominated 
for much of the last century.7  While the value of the residual claim is our 
best proxy for the goal of long-term corporate wealth maximization, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to find the party that most accurately 
represents that interest.  Many investors have significant interests in the 
value of the residual claim without holding stock, and many shareholders 
have completely hedged their economic interest in a firm in which they 
own equity shares.8  These changes to the meaning and representation of 
a corporation’s ownership are significant, and this Part considers each in 
turn. 
A.  Berle and Means: The Goal of Corporate Control 
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means 
identified the separation of ownership from control as the defining prob-
lem facing corporate governance.9  Their book explored the basic identity 
of the corporate shareholder and sought to describe what corporate 
shareholding in America had become.10  They focused particularly on the 
evolution of corporations from a time when a few owners managed a 
firm themselves to one in which multitudes of private citizens invested in 
                                                 
 6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 113. 
 7. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins  
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2008) [hereinafter Shareholder 
Primacy]. 
 8. Frankel, supra note 5, at __. 
 9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. 
 10. Id. 
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large, public corporations that were operated by professional managers 
who owned very little of the firm’s equity.11  Beyond giving up power 
over day-to-day corporate decisions, shareholders also relinquished mea-
ningful property rights in the corporation’s assets.12  They were said to 
“own” the corporation without enjoying the rights and privileges that 
usually accompany ownership.13  Shareholders are willing to submit to 
this investment structure because it allows them to diversify their hold-
ings, but the separation of ownership of assets from control over those 
assets presents unusual problems that Berle and Means sought to identify 
and resolve. 
While the normative prescriptions that Berle and Means suggested 
have not withstood the test of time,14 their description of the corporate 
form and their observations about its peculiarities in the realm of proper-
ty ownership are still influential.15  They claimed that “[i]t requires little 
analysis to make plain the fact that private property, as understood in the 
capitalist system, is rapidly losing its original characteristics.  Unless the 
law stops the wide open gap which the corporate mechanism has intro-
duced, the entire system has to be revalued.”16  They charted the rise of 
the public corporation as such businesses grew to include many thou-
sands of owners and to control a significant share of American wealth.  
They tied their view of how the new American “princes of industry”17—
the corporate managers—should operate firms to the origins of the busi-
ness form.  Berle and Means argued that because business owners once 
controlled and disposed of the business’s assets, the shareholders—the 
putative owners of the firm—should direct corporate goals, though not 
the means used to achieve them.18  Specifically, they identified the 
shareholders’ ownership interest as being one that managers ought to 
seek to advance in their management of the corporation.19  They argued 
that corporate managers’ power must be exercised “only for the ratable 
benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”20 
                                                 
 11. Id. at 118–40. 
 12. Id. at 119. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Bratton, supra note 2, at 739. 
 15. Id. 
 16. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 219. 
 17. Id. at 4. 
 18. Id. at 6–7 (summarizing the rise of the public corporation as distinct from the private cor-
poration), 112–14 (asserting, without challenge, the basic understanding that managers should oper-
ate the firm in a manner designed to enhance the interests of its owners). 
 19. Bratton & Wachter, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 7, at 108. 
 20. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 220. 
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B.  Shareholder Primacy 
The shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance finds its 
roots in Berle and Means’s identification of the separation of ownership 
from control.21  The theory holds that shareholders’ ownership interests 
should dominate the way a corporation is run.22  The shareholder prima-
cy norm, or shareholder wealth maximization norm, addresses the sepa-
ration by specifying what the goals of control should be.  The goal of 
corporate management is, ultimately, the goal driving all property man-
agement—to maximize the value of the assets under the manager’s con-
trol.  Shareholders are the “owners” of the residual claim because they 
hold claims against the value of the firm’s equity in a hypothetical liqui-
dation.  The value of the residual claim, or the value of the firm’s equity, 
is the measure of a firm’s wealth.  Accordingly, the shareholders, as 
those holding claims against the equity interest, are the “owners” of the 
firm’s equity.  Shareholders, as residual claimants, are presumed to have 
incentives that are aligned with the maximization of the firm’s wealth, so 
the argument goes, and therefore, their interests should be paramount in 
determining what is best for the corporation.23  This reasoning has guided 
corporate governance law and practice and has dominated the scholar-
ship since Berle’s time, even as Berle himself switched camps and began 
to prefer a corporate decision-making structure that considered the inter-
ests of corporate stakeholders other than shareholders and the interests of 
society as a whole.24 
Corporate law has always contemplated shareholder control by al-
lowing shareholders to elect and monitor directors to some extent.25  
Shareholders have the ability to sue directors derivatively, on behalf of 
the corporation.26  The law surrounding both derivative litigation and the 
corporate fiduciary duties that it is most often used to enforce is intricate 
and complicated.  The Delaware courts walk a thin line between share-
                                                 
 21. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. 
 22. Id. at 120. 
 23. Shareholder primacists agree that corporations should be operated to maximize corporate 
wealth, but they disagree about what degree of shareholder control is appropriate.  For instance, 
Lucian Bebchuk, a prominent shareholder primacist, consistently advocates stronger shareholder 
powers over corporate control.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Pow-
er, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 835 (2005).  Stephen Bainbridge, on the other hand, espousing a theory 
of “director primacy,” approves of shareholder primacy “ends,” such as wealth maximization, but 
argues that the “means” shareholders prefer should not drive corporate decision-making.  Stephen 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy  The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
547 (2003). 
 24. Bratton & Wachter, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 7, at 135, 147, 149. 
 25. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 
417, 421 (2006). 
 26. Id. at 421. 
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holder interests and managerial discretion, with managerial discretion 
almost always winning the day.27  A strong business judgment rule is 
coupled with strong, though rarely enforced, fiduciary rhetoric to try to 
keep managers faithful to shareholder wealth maximization without al-
lowing individual shareholders to guide business decisions.28  There is a 
pervasive sense that shareholders, as owners of the residual claim, have 
the right incentives and that they should be able to enforce, to some ex-
tent, an expectation that management acts to maximize the value of their 
shares.  For this reason, shareholders have been given derivative standing 
to enforce duties owed to the corporation, and the shareholder franchise, 
however weak, has been preserved.  Both voting and derivative standing 
are supposed to be ways for shareholders to exert their will or protect 
their interests.  The owners of the business thus discipline its managers. 
1.  The Collective Action Problem and Shareholder Power 
Berle and Means detailed both the original justifications for these 
shareholder rights and also described how, even in the late 1920s and the 
early 1930s, shareholders of major American companies had become so 
numerous and widely dispersed that the common indicia of property 
ownership did not describe a shareholder’s interest in a corporation.29  
The wide dispersal of shareholders led to collective action problems and 
apathy that made shareholder discipline of managers ineffective at best 
and almost impossible at worst.30 
To remedy this ineffectiveness, Berle suggested the enforcement of 
trust-like fiduciary duties31 and the use of sophisticated market represent-
atives to concentrate shareholder power.32  The latter suggestion was put 
into practice.  Institutional shareholders have entered the market as a way 
to concentrate shareholder power.  Fund managers, for example, exercise 
their investors’ shareholder voting rights so that individual and widely 
dispersed shareholders do not have to pay attention to the performance of 
particular corporations and can instead simply monitor the performance 
of the funds in which they invest.33  Because most of the relatively so-
                                                 
 27. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 249–56 
(2009). 
 28. Andrew Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 
466–47 (2009). 
 29. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 244. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1074 
(1931). 
 32. Bratton & Wachter, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 7, at 106 (quoting ADOLF A. BERLE, 
JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1928)). 
 33. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). 
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phisticated fund managers who represent investors seek the advice of 
knowledgeable analysts and proxy advisors who research issues put to 
shareholder votes, their rational apathy does not leave as significant a 
hole in corporate governance as there may have been in the past. 
Although institutional shareholders hold the largest shares of most 
major American corporations and exercise most of the voting power, 
they have not proven to be the effective monitors Berle would have pre-
dicted.  The failure is due, in large part, to the fact that the costs of man-
aging funds cut into investor returns.34  If the costs of an action taken to 
monitor a particular corporation might exceed its benefits, fund managers 
do better not taking the chance.35  Even if the monitoring activity is suc-
cessful or results in a net gain to the corporation, the benefits must be 
shared with all other shareholders, and the portion of the benefits that 
inure to the active fund manager may not cover the costs.36  Therefore, a 
collective action problem still exists among institutional investors, even 
though they have concentrated the power of individual, dispersed share-
holders.37  Because they are competing with one another, the relative 
ability of institutional shareholders to communicate and coordinate does 
not overcome these problems.38  Despite the persistent collective action 
problems plaguing the shareholder role in corporate governance, share-
holders still hold the tools necessary to exert influence over corporate 
control in their voting power. 
2.  Shareholder Power and Changes in Corporate Control 
Berle and Means’s articulation of the separation of ownership from 
control began as a description of the fact that owners—the sharehold-
ers—do not exercise control over the daily business operations of a cor-
poration or the disposal of its assets.  A separation also exists between 
ownership and control; that is, the owners’ ability to direct or influence 
control is limited and the means of influence are indirect and weak.  The 
ability of shareholders to directly influence managerial decisions lies in 
their one real power over management—the right to elect a company’s 
board of directors.  If shareholders are unhappy with management, they 
can either sell their shares or elect a new board.39 
                                                 
 34. Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism, 79 GEO. L J. 445, 452, 473 (1991). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 454. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 452–54. 
 39. Velasco, supra note 25, at 409. 
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For years, proxy fights were the common method of changing a 
corporation’s management.40  Interested shareholders would vie for prox-
ies sufficient to defeat the incumbent board’s reelection.41  However, 
proxy fights were expensive and rarely successful, and they thus fell out 
of favor.42  The market responded to the relative powerlessness of share-
holders over corporate affairs when acquirers began launching tender 
offers in the 1960s.43  A rigorous takeover culture peaked in the 1980s.44  
The market for corporate control identifies companies that are managed 
poorly and seeks to unseat current managers through acquisitions.45  
Shareholders enjoy significant potential power and profit in their ability 
to tender shares to acquirers.46  Once an acquirer holds a majority of a 
firm’s shares, it can install more effective management and enjoy the 
profits resulting from the change.47 
However, the rise of such corporate acquisitions was hindered al-
most from the beginning by anti-takeover legislation.  The Williams Act, 
which passed in 1968, significantly impeded the use of tender offers.48  
Managers responded strongly against the lack of job security and insta-
bility caused by hostile takeovers, and they were successful in lobbying 
for legislation that imposes significant barriers to those acquisitions.49  In 
addition to the federal Williams Act, states have enacted anti-takeover 
legislation that makes hostile acquisitions very difficult and expensive.50  
Further, courts have upheld the use of market innovations, such as the 
poison pill, that effectively bar the hostile acquisition of companies im-
plementing them.51  All of these actions protect management from hostile 
takeovers and thus entrench them in their positions, regardless of how 
good of a job they are doing, perhaps to the detriment of the company’s 
shareholders.52 
The practical result of legislative actions to limit shareholder con-
trol is a shareholder primacy norm with limited means of shareholder 
                                                 
 40. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 
120 (2008). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR 
NABISCO (1990). 
 45. MACEY, supra note 40. 
 46. Id. at 119. 
 47. Id. at 119–21. 
 48. Id. at 122. 
 49. Id. at 119. 
 50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2009). 
 51. MACEY, supra note 40, at 123–24. 
 52. Id. at 119–121. 
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enforcement.  The separation Berle and Means identified persists despite 
advances in corporate law and investment.  While shareholders have 
found more concentrated and sophisticated representation, they still do 
not have a powerful voice in corporate governance.  In a way, sharehold-
er interests are held paramount only theoretically, as a concern for those 
interests implies a concern for the value of corporate equity.  The indirect 
relationship between shareholder interests and corporate action is not 
necessarily a bad thing.  Shareholders, even institutional investors, still 
lack the information and business acumen to profitably take decision-
making authority from corporate managers.  Instead, their role in corpo-
rate governance has largely been to respond to public information in their 
trades in a way that leads to a reliable valuation of corporate assets under 
current management.53 
While individual shareholders may have trouble influencing corpo-
rate governance, the market for securities is supposed to impose discip-
line through its pricing of companies.  The federal securities laws 
enacted just after the publication of The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property, as well as subsequent amendments, seek to bring informa-
tion about the health of corporations to the securities markets.  Complete, 
honest disclosures about public corporations are supposed to inform 
market trades that set corporate stock prices, which in turn, tell investors 
how healthy a company is and what its prospects for future profits are 
likely to be.54  Market reliance on corporate disclosures has become a 
significant part of corporate governance law.  The accuracy of those dis-
closures is crucially important to the efficient functioning of securities 
markets and, in turn, to the American economy.  While those disclosure 
requirements do not seek to benefit shareholders exclusively, and thus 
are not properly part of the application of the shareholder primacy theory 
to corporate governance law, they and the securities markets emphasize 
the importance of stock price to corporate wealth and management.  To 
the extent securities markets are presumed to be efficient, it is because 
stock prices are supposed to reflect all publicly available information 
about the relative health and profitability of a company under its current 
management.55  This information appraises the management’s ability and 
alerts shareholders and other market participants of potential problems 
with a firm’s profitability.  Shareholders make investment decisions 
                                                 
 53. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 247 (“The net result of stripping the stockholder of vir-
tually all his power within the corporation is to throw him upon an agency lying outside the corpora-
tion itself—the public market.”). 
 54. Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 945, 965–66 (1991). 
 55. Id. 
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largely in reliance on the accuracy of stock prices, and managers make or 
lose careers based on their stock’s performance. 
Because shareholder primacy demands that corporate officers and 
directors work to enhance shareholder value, and because that value is 
measured by stock price, corporate managers focus on taking actions that 
will enhance stock price.  The focus on stock price as a metric of corpo-
rate health may have caused significant problems recently56 and may not 
be the optimal way to determine which course of action is best for the 
corporation.  Using shareholder interests as a proxy for corporate inter-
ests and share price as a proxy for shareholder interests does not actually 
mean that what is best for share price is best for long-term corporate 
wealth maximization.57  The next section explains the reasons for this 
disconnect between stock price and corporate health and argues that 
while individual shareholders’ interests may not be the best determinant 
of corporate interests, the overall value of the equity position is the best 
proxy we have for long-term corporate welfare.  Accordingly, we should 
find a way for corporate governance to honor that position. 
C.  The Residual Claim as a Proxy for Corporate Ownership and 
Corporate Welfare 
When corporations were owned by a few, concentrated sharehold-
ers who knew each other and could confer about questions of corporate 
business, honoring and identifying the owners’ interests in making cor-
porate decisions was not a difficult task.  At the time, it was clear that 
those owners’ interests should control and that the corporate assets 
should be controlled for their benefit.58  As corporate share ownership 
expanded to more dispersed shareholders with diversified portfolios and 
less interest in the fortunes of each individual company in which they 
invested, the separation of ownership from control became apparent and 
changed the nature of corporate governance.  The interests of particular 
equity holders have become harder to identify,59 creditors exercise more 
control over the corporate affairs of even solvent companies,60 and it is 
no longer clear how to identify which corporate constituents’ interests 
and preferences should be prioritized.61  Still, we have no better proxy 
                                                 
 56. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empower-
ment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 710 (2010) [hereinafter The Case Against]. 
 57. Id. at 726. 
 58. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 59. Frankel, supra note 5, at__. 
 60. See Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Boardroom  The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders 
in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009). 
 61. See Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247 (1999). 
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for corporate wealth maximization than the equity position.  The value of 
the residual claim best represents the interests of the goal of long-term 
corporate wealth maximization. 
If we return to our basic understandings about corporations, it 
should be apparent that long-term wealth maximization is the proper cor-
porate objective.  Corporations are, first and foremost, businesses de-
signed to produce and market products and increase those products’ val-
ue and relevance to society over time.  In order to be successful or even 
to be a worthwhile investment vehicle, a business must have long-term 
prospects for viability and potential for growth.  To the extent that we 
replace this focus with one that worries over the value of a security, even 
if that security is stock, we irretrievably muddy the waters and seriously 
mangle managerial incentives and focus.62  
1.  Incentive Compensation: Bringing Ownership and Control Closer 
Together 
The recent unrest over incentive compensation is one example of 
this problem.  There, a good faith attempt to shorten the distance between 
ownership and control may have actually widened it.  Incentive compen-
sation sounds sensible.  It stands to reason that one way to encourage 
officers and directors to make decisions that will maximize the firm’s 
value is to pay them more as a direct result of increases in the firm’s val-
ue.  One way to align their incentives with those of the residual claimants 
is to give managers a stake in the residual claim.  This kind of compensa-
tion has allowed corporate executives, particularly senior officers, to earn 
staggering income.  Stock options are the most commonly used and, of-
ten, the most lucrative form of incentive compensation and can work be-
cause they reward managers directly for increases in the company’s stock 
price that occur during their tenure.  Managers, then, have a direct inter-
est in taking corporate actions intended to increase the stock price, which 
is supposed to be a reflection of the value of the firm’s residual claim.63 
                                                 
 62. See Bratton & Wachter, The Case Against, supra note 56, at 726. 
 63. Professors Thomas and Martin state: 
[T]he conflict between managers and shareholders interests can be mitigated through the 
use of incentive compensation packages which align the incentives of managers with 
those of shareholders.  Stock options can be used to provide managers with an equity in-
terest in the corporation.  As executives’ level of stock ownership increases, they will 
bear a greater percentage of the costs of any deviations from the standard of profit max-
imization.  In this situation, self-interest will lead managers to act in shareholders’ best 
interests. 
Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Com-
pensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1031 n.40 (1999). 
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Problems with this approach to compensation have become appar-
ent.  Stock options may give officers too much of an interest in short-
term stock price increases at the expense of long-term gain.64  Also, ma-
nipulations in options themselves, such as options backdating, have 
created serious public relations problems and expensive litigation.65  Ra-
ther than trying to devise precise compensation formulas to perfectly 
align managerial interests with those of the corporation, which has long 
been a goal of executive compensation innovators, it might be more ap-
propriate to realize that such a bundle of securities might not exist.  It 
might not be possible to design a group of securities or incentives that 
perfectly approximates the corporation’s value at any given time.  Any 
attempts to do so may have unintended consequences for managerial in-
centives along with the intended benefits.  If it were true that sharehold-
ers did have perfectly aligned incentives, then making managers share-
holders would be enough to resolve agency costs caused by the separa-
tion of ownership and control; however, making managers shareholders 
has not yet been sufficient to resolve such agency costs.  Does that mean 
that we have not made managers “owners” of the corporation by giving 
them stock or stock options?  If we have effectively made managers 
owners, at least to the extent that they own stock in the corporation they 
manage, then the agency problem may be caused by something other 
than the separation of ownership from control.  If they are not owners, 
then perhaps we are using the wrong definition of “ownership.”66 
2.  Trouble Defining “Ownership” 
Because of the ways securities have evolved over time, many secu-
rity holders other than shareholders have direct financial interests in the 
value of the residual claim, and individual shareholders themselves, or at 
least those casting votes on their behalf, may not.67  The blurring of these 
lines has made pinpointing the proper “owners” of the corporation more 
difficult.  It is less clear why some parties that have interests in the value 
of the residual claim have the wrong incentives or even worse incentives 
                                                 
 64. “Some analysts have argued that the equity-based executive compensation which became 
increasingly important, particularly stock options, created incentive for executives to massage ac-
counting data to make profits appear high in the short-run and thus drive up the company’s stock 
price.”  Brett H. McDonnell, Sox Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 505, 514 (2004). 
 65. The Associated Press, Broadcom to Settle Backdating Suit for $160 Million, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/technology/companies/30broad 
com.html?scp=8&sq=options%20backdating&st=cse. 
 66. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, The Case Against, supra note 56, at 675–76 (explaining 
Jensen & Meckling’s theory that shareholders and managers share incidents of ownership through 
their reserved contract rights). 
 67. Frankel, supra note 5, at ___; Hu & Black, supra note 4. 
2010] Revisiting Berle 799 
than some direct shareholders who may have completely hedged their 
investment in a firm’s stock and so are not exposed to vacillations in the 
value of the residual claim.  A few innovations in particular make it far 
more difficult to identify exactly which interest represents “ownership” 
and which interested parties should exercise the most control. 
With the increased trading of derivatives—that is, securities whose 
values are derived from the values of other securities—shareholders are 
not the only investors with economic interests in the value of a compa-
ny’s stock.68  For instance, options holders or sellers may have direct 
economic interests in the value of a corporation’s stock price.  If we 
think that it is important to give ownership rights to the parties having an 
interest in the value of the residual claim, then we should not assume that 
shareholders are the only such group or that they are all necessarily ex-
posed to the financial consequences of a firm’s success or failure.  If we 
think that an interest in the residual claim is the important metric and that 
interest is what essentially creates an “equity owner” or a part-owner of 
the firm, then why do options holders not count?  Why do we not take 
the time to figure out which parties are actually interested in the value of 
the residual claim before allowing securities holders to vote or bring de-
rivative actions?  While some options holders are investing in an interest 
in the value of the residual claim, shareholders may have hedged their 
financial interest in the equity of the firm, thereby divesting themselves 
of the economic incentive that makes their rights and their voice in cor-
porate governance legitimate.69 
One such example of the disconnect between shareholder power 
and financial interest is the “empty voting” that Professors Henry Hu and 
Bernard Black explained.70  Empty voting, in its most basic form, in-
volves acquiring the right to vote shares in a corporation without having 
an economic interest in the value of the shares.71  This allows shareholder 
votes to actually be cast against the economic interest in the firm.72  
Empty voting is a much more extreme example of simpler forms of con-
flicted interest.  Shareholders could always buy derivatives to hedge 
against movements in the corporation’s stock price and could hold signif-
icant economic interests opposed to the best interests of one corporation 
in which they have invested.  It is no secret or surprise that shareholders’ 
individual interests may significantly differ. 
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Because of their different portfolios or different interests in a given 
corporation beyond shareholding, individual shareholders have always 
been poor or, at least, unreliable representatives of an entire shareholder 
class.73  Such economic differences also undermine the validity of the 
relatively weak shareholder democracy.  Shareholder votes are not nec-
essarily cast in the corporate best interest and, to the extent that those 
shares voted against the corporate interest are concentrated and orga-
nized, such adverse votes can affect outcomes.74  In such circumstances, 
it is much harder to classify ownership of stock as meaningful ownership 
of the firm or defend the shareholder position as one that should wield 
voting power.  It is not at all clear that shareholders are the group that 
should exercise powers over corporate governance.  Their financial inter-
est in the residual claim can no longer be assumed.  Still, it is difficult to 
discover all of those who have the right economic interest in the residual 
claim.  Thus, shareholders are still our best proxy for that position.  
Going forward, it may be useful to find a way to represent that position 
without relying on any one shareholder or group of shareholders to do so 
on behalf of others.  The next Part suggests the use of an equity trustee, 
or shareholder representative, to represent the equity interest without fo-
cusing in particular on individual equity holders. 
II.  REPRESENTING THE EQUITY INTEREST 
To some extent, Berle and Means and the shareholder primacists 
are correct that it is incumbent upon management to pursue shareholders’ 
best interests in making business decisions for the corporation.  If long-
term wealth maximization is the standard, preference of the equity inter-
est must be the norm.  Some scholars argue that directors have to balance 
a number of interests in deciding how to operate the business profita-
bly.75  In any case, corporate law has given shareholders a particular role 
and a set of monitoring tasks that no other group can perform in the same 
way because of their interest in the value of the residual claim.  The equi-
ty interest may have preferences that compete with those of other parties 
in interest, and the shareholder interest is not always able to dominate 
because of other powers reserved by other investors.  Loan covenants, 
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for example, may prevent a corporation from taking risky actions that 
shareholders might prefer, or collective bargaining agreements may pre-
vent the corporation from lowering wages.  A director must consider all 
circumstances in choosing the profit-maximizing course.76 
While directors are responsible for making business decisions, the 
shareholders have also been given a particular job.  They are to monitor 
and discipline management according to the officers’ and directors’ suc-
cess in maximizing corporate profit.  However, the collective action 
problem means that the shareholder voice may fall short of corporate 
law’s expectations for it.  In prior work, I have suggested using a share-
holder representative I call an equity trustee to overcome the shareholder 
collective action problem and to do the shareholder job more effective-
ly.77 
An equity trustee would represent the identifiable interest of the eq-
uity class in long-term corporate wealth maximization.  As noted above, 
corporate law values the incentives of those with financial interests in the 
value of the residual claim.  However, it has become increasingly diffi-
cult to reliably identify those parties, and while they are the obvious 
choice, shareholders do not all necessarily share that interest.  Individual 
equity holders have interests that vary widely and may actually be at 
odds with each other given whatever their other investments are.  These 
divergent interests and the collective action problem make individual 
shareholders poor shepherds of the equity cause.  Giving the equity inter-
est a sophisticated, attentive representative to do the shareholder job and 
exercise shareholder powers would go a long way toward making the 
equity position in corporate law and governance more meaningful. 
In some ways, the use of an equity trustee could be seen as a natural 
progression in response to the collective action problem.  When Berle 
and Means first wrote about the wide dispersal and relatively anonymous 
nature of share ownership, they anticipated that something akin to insti-
tutional investors could concentrate the power of many shares through 
one active monitor.78  Institutional investors have become very common 
and now account for the vast majority of shareholding, but they have 
failed to actively participate in corporate governance.79  They have, how-
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ever, reached out to proxy advising firms for help with deciding how to 
vote.  Proxy advisors make recommendations to institutional investors 
about how they should vote on broad corporate issues.80  In this way, 
proxy advisors counter some of the effects of rational shareholder apathy 
by helping institutional shareholders to wisely cast their votes.  The insti-
tutional investors simply delegate their information-gathering responsi-
bility.  An equity trustee picks up on some of the same themes and con-
cerns but goes a step further. 
Like institutional investors, an equity trustee would concentrate the 
voice of many dispersed shareholders into one knowledgeable, sophisti-
cated entity.  However, instead of managing a portfolio of assets that 
create interests that may differ from the corporation, an equity trustee 
would represent the interest in corporate wealth maximization as it re-
gards one company.  It would represent the collective equity interest, not 
individual equity holders.  It is difficult, then, to figure out how to select 
the equity trustee. 
To prevent the capture by management to which other “gatekee-
pers” have fallen victim,81 the equity trustee should not be selected by 
management.  Instead, a committee of the corporation’s seven largest 
shareholders, called the equity committee, should appoint the equity trus-
tee at stated intervals.  Because the makeup of the equity committee can 
change at any time and may indeed change frequently, the equity trustee 
would not be pressured to abide by the preferences of committee mem-
bers to the exclusion of other shareholders.  Further, the individual inter-
ests of the equity committee members are likely to differ significantly, so 
the committee provides a useful nexus between the equity trustee and the 
actual shareholders without running the risk of binding the equity trustee 
to idiosyncratic shareholder preferences.  As noted above, it is not at all 
clear that individual shareholders should matter very much to corporate 
governance, but they are the best proxy we have for the residual claim.  
The best way to represent that very important interest may be to have a 
loose association of significant shareholders choosing a representative 
who will owe duties to the entire class. 
Selected for a finite, renewable term by the equity committee, the 
equity trustee would owe fiduciary duties to shareholders to represent the 
equity interest carefully and zealously.  The trustee would not be respon-
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sible for making business decisions, but rather for informing sharehold-
ers of important matters, advising shareholder votes, determining wheth-
er shareholder litigation is appropriate, and serving as a shareholder 
voice before management when necessary.82  The equity committee 
would be responsible for supervising the equity trustee and for determin-
ing if the equity trustee has violated its duties to shareholders.83  Partici-
pation on the equity committee would be mandatory for the seven largest 
shareholders, barring disabling conflicts, but would not necessarily be 
very time consuming.84  The members of the equity committee would not 
have to do much more to monitor the equity trustee than they do to moni-
tor management now—this level of effort would go further toward effec-
tive monitoring of a position as limited as that of the equity trustee than it 
does toward the monitoring of directors who have more expansive roles. 
While the equity trustee would be charged with acting on behalf of 
the equity interest represented by the long-term maximization of the val-
ue of the residual claim, it is important to refrain from using incentive 
compensation to try to align the trustee’s interests.  While compensation 
with stock and options may give the equity trustee a stake in the value of 
the residual claim, it may also give the trustee the same misguided incen-
tives that have plagued executives with similar compensation packages.  
Attaching the equity trustee’s interests too closely to the stock price 
again places an emphasis on a symptom of the value of the residual claim 
instead of focusing efforts on the substance.  Stock price reflects the val-
ue of the residual claim, in part, but can also include other information or 
noise about market or industry fluctuations.  Additionally, stock price 
can be manipulated through accounting or management decisions in 
ways that cause it to reflect information about short-term value to the 
exclusion of long-term effects.85  For those reasons, tying the equity trus-
tee’s compensation to stock price might cause the trustee to have some of 
the same problems representing the shareholder class as individual 
shareholders and management have.  Instead, it makes more sense to pay 
the equity trustee a fixed salary as other professionals would be paid.  
This prevents the equity trustee from having interests in short-term price 
fluctuations and focuses the equity trustee’s attention on steady, long-
term gain. 
The biggest advantage to the equity trustee form is that each corpo-
ration and equity committee can structure the office as they see fit.  I do 
not propose that equity trustees be mandatory.  Rather, shareholders who 
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want an equity trustee can push for the appointment of one.  An equity 
committee can come together to consider the question and decide wheth-
er an equity trustee is desirable.  Then, the equity committee and man-
agement can negotiate an agreement with the equity trustee that deter-
mines that trustee’s specific powers and duties.  It is a flexible tool that 
the parties can use to return the shareholder voice to its intended place in 
corporate governance. 
Making that change might actually inspire changes to the role of 
shareholders in corporate governance.  Because the shareholder pool has 
changed so dramatically over the course of time, it stands to reason that 
corporate governance might also adapt and change.  Maybe the share-
holder collective action problem has prevented those changes from oc-
curring.  Perhaps thinking about the shareholder voice in a new way will 
open possibilities for more effective governance forms or will, at least, 
help us understand how governance may improve.  The equity trustee is 
one suggestion about how the corporate governance structure may be 
changed for the better.  Adopting the use of equity trustees would dem-
onstrate an understanding of both the importance of the equity position 
and the difficulty in pinpointing the particular parties in the best position 
to fulfill its role in corporate governance.  Further, the proposal questions 
basic assumptions about the corporate form and acknowledges important 
changes in corporate structure.  Berle and Means have inspired corporate 
law scholars to consider the corporate form and document its changes.  
Following their example can open new avenues for future scholarly un-
dertakings. 
III.  FUTURE AVENUES FOR RESEARCH 
Perhaps Berle and Means’s greatest contribution is the care they 
took to paint a thorough and contemporary portrait of corporate gover-
nance, emphasizing how it had evolved from the first corporate gover-
nance laws were enacted and how the character of property ownership 
changed as a result.  They asked the basic questions about what it meant 
to be a shareholder, what rights shareholders had, what responsibilities 
they should have, and how management should be obligated to respond 
to the corporate structure.  They started from scratch and built a picture 
of corporate governance from the ground up, noting points along the way 
at which problems might arise.  The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property was published after the 1929 stock market crash, before the 
1933 and 1934 securities acts were promulgated, and even before Dela-
ware corporate law dominated public corporations.  For that reason, the 
authors’ observations and description of the corporate structure influ-
enced much of the law and theory that followed. 
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Just as important as the thoroughness of Berle’s work is its humili-
ty.  He acknowledged that the world he was describing would change 
dramatically before he and other scholars could even begin to understand 
it.  On the very first page of The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty, the authors acknowledge that, “[s]pectacular as its rise has been, 
every indication seems to be that the system will move forward to pro-
portions which would stagger imagination today . . . .”86 
As Berle and Means were when they wrote The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property, we are trying to make sense of a catastrophic 
financial collapse and trying to think of ways to address the pervasive 
effects of financial markets on our society.  Various scholars have made 
great strides in achieving this goal and have challenged very basic as-
sumptions about the corporate structure, and in doing so, about corporate 
governance as well.  The current dominance of law review articles in 
legal scholarship means that small contributions are made a piece at a 
time, with scholars engaging in a constant dialogue about the state of 
affairs.  The increased popularity of empirical research has helped to 
measure and quantify certain aspects of corporate law and practice in 
new ways.  As the scholarship advances, so does our understanding of 
innovations in financial markets.  Still, we remain, in many ways, stuck 
with the governance forms that Berle and Means described, fully ac-
knowledging the changes that have occurred in the meantime but not yet 
determining how those changes should affect corporate governance.  In-
stead, we have clung perhaps too faithfully to the traditional corporate 
form even as our financial markets may have outgrown it. 
Some scholars have worked to clarify our understanding of corpo-
rate governance by describing the current governance structure in new 
ways.  There are far too many significant contributions to list compre-
hensively here, but a few examples make the point.  For instance, Marga-
ret Blair and Lynn Stout’s work on team production has changed the way 
scholars talk about directors’ duties and the corporate form.87  Stephen 
Bainbridge’s work on director primacy has served a similar purpose by 
helping to focus our attention on what directors are supposed to do, while 
also thinking outside the bounds of strict shareholder primacy.88  Corpo-
rate bankruptcy scholars have helped us develop an understanding that 
the role of creditors in corporate governance at times supersedes the role 
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of shareholders.89  Others have called for significant changes to the cor-
porate structure.  For instance, Douglas Baird and Todd Henderson argue 
that corporate fiduciary duties should be eliminated in light of enhanced 
investor sophistication and the relative weakness of corporate fiduciary 
duties as they are currently enforced.90  Bernard Black and Henry Hu 
introduced us to the practice of empty voting and other investor innova-
tions that challenge our basic assumptions about the proper role of share-
holders.91  To that end, numerous scholars have explored the work done 
by institutional shareholders and what that should tell us about how such 
shareholders fit into corporate governance.92  The contributions of mod-
ern scholars to our understanding of corporate governance as presently 
constructed are too numerous to list exhaustively here.  We have a solid 
picture of the investment and managerial cultures and are able to respond 
quickly, but thoughtfully, to new trends and innovations. 
Other scholars have suggested that we move beyond the corporate 
form.  For example, Larry Ribstein has argued that certain unincorpo-
rated forms may be better suited to certain businesses’ needs, even if 
those firms are large and currently publicly held.93  Also, an important 
scholarly movement has looked overseas for ideas about how corporate 
governance might best be structured.  Comparative corporate governance 
scholarship has made important contributions as we strive to understand 
our place in a global economy and as we try to re-order our organization 
of business. 
Still, we have not done enough to question our basic assumptions 
about the corporate structure as it stands now.  Enough has changed since 
the days of Berle and Means that it may be appropriate to start with a 
nearly blank slate in an effort to describe the various forms of corporate 
power and corporate investment and how those elements of the corporate 
structure fit together.  There are strong arguments that if such an under-
taking were necessary, the market would be making significant changes 
to corporate governance. 
That argument, while essential to any body of scholarship that 
seeks to influence a robust market, does not tell the entire story.  For one, 
corporate laws, which are not as easily modified through market forces, 
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may stand in the way of what would otherwise be the natural evolution 
of the corporate structure.94  Much of corporate structure is determined 
by statute, and relevant laws may prevent corporations and market partic-
ipants from evolving as they otherwise might.95  Further, market partici-
pants do not always have the luxury of examining the current corporate 
landscape critically or with an eye for improvements.  For instance, even 
though institutional shareholders might realize gains from more carefully 
monitoring management, no single fund manager wants to invest the re-
sources in doing so because that cost may hurt its bottom line and put it 
at a competitive disadvantage compared with other similar funds.96  For 
any market participant to take the time to devise a scheme that might im-
prove corporate governance, it would require more investment than it 
may be worth for that individual.  Also, encouraging market actors to 
accept a new idea may call for more of an appetite for risk than they may 
have.  To that end, legal scholars, with plenty of time and inclination to 
think of corporate governance and market forces in new ways, can play 
an important role in commenting on market evolution and suggesting 
new paths it may take.  It is a conversation that we can have with market 
participants; our critical thinking and suggestions can become part of the 
market evolution. 
Now would be an appropriate time to take stock of corporate go-
vernance and corporate investment, as Berle and Means did, by question-
ing our basic assumptions about the corporate structure and by noting 
critical ways in which it has changed over the years.  We should develop 
a complete understanding of the different forms corporate investment 
takes and what those forms mean for corporate rights and responsibili-
ties.  While forms of investment evolve and investor behavior changes as 
the market adapts to shifting conditions, the corporate governance struc-
ture is relatively static and may not respond quickly enough to significant 
shifts in the market.  For public companies, the most recent compulsory 
changes to corporate governance structure have come from federal secur-
ities laws or public listing requirements promulgated by the major ex-
changes.97  These changes still do not address basic corporate governance 
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issues, such as which parties should have what powers, how their rights 
should be enforced, and how officers and directors should be monitored.  
All of these questions should be examined anew now that corporate 
business and investment in securities have experienced such a jarring 
revolution. 
Legal scholars are already picking apart the financial crisis of 
2008–2009 to look for clues about how it happened and to try to figure 
out how a similar crisis could be avoided in the future.  Examining who 
owns what and what that means, and ought to mean, in the structure of a 
firm might help to move forward from the crisis.  Living as far as we do 
from the world Berle and Means explored, we should not assume that 
they describe a corporate form that we would find useful. 
CONCLUSION 
Berle and Means provided an extremely valuable portrait of corpo-
rate law and the corporate form in The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.  Elements of their descriptions of the public corporation endure 
today.  Changes in investment have changed the ways corporations work 
and have influenced our notions of corporate ownership.  Those differ-
ences may necessitate changes to the corporate structure.  One valuable 
change might be to adopt the use of equity trustees to represent the equi-
ty interest and perform the shareholder job in corporate governance.  As 
legal scholars, we should carefully examine the corporate structure while 
questioning our basic assumptions about the corporate form. 
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